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Venezuela: How a Hydrocarbons Law
Crippled an Oil Giant
By STACY RENTNER*

Introduction
February 2003 marked the end of a nine-week national strike in
Venezuela that had begun in early December 2002 and was designed
to oust its president, Hugo Chavez Frias.' Chavez was elected with
56% of the vote in 1998,2 and reelected with 60% of the vote in 2000,'
reaching popularity highs, according to opinion polls, of nearly 80%
during his presidency.' How is it possible that in such a short period
of time, the country changed its attitude from almost unanimous
support for Chavez to such an overwhelming desire for him to resign
the presidency that it was willing to cripple its economy with a
national work stoppage? Such a complex situation cannot be
explained by pointing to any one factor; however, the Hydrocarbons
Law decreed by President Chavez in 2001 seemed to provide the
catalyst for this dramatic turn of events.
Venezuela was the world's largest exporter of oil from 1908 to
1935,' and since that time the oil sector has been the driving force of
the country's economy. Venezuela depends on revenues from its
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004.

1. Venezuela Re-opens After Strike, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2003), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2721325.stm>.
2. POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, VENEZUELA: PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, 1998, at <www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Venezuela/pre98.html>
(visited Dec. 5, 2003).
3. POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, VENEZUELA: PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS,
2000,
at
<www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Venezuela/
pres2000.html> (visited Dec. 5, 2003).
4. Adam Easton, Venezuela's Escalating Oil Dispute, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2002),
at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/1915859.stm>.
5. Timeline: Venezuela, BBC NEWS, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/1229348.stm> (visited Jan. 24, 2004).
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state-owned oil sector to operate virtually every facet of its
government,6 relying on oil revenues for approximately 50% of
government revenue, 30% of gross domestic product and 80% of
exports.7 Although Chavez's popularity had been waning for many
reasons, the final blow the country would endure was the November
13, 2001 passage of the new Decreto con Fuerza de Ley Orgdnica de

Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbons Law) on, which outlined the new
structure of and regulations pertaining to Venezuela's oil industry.8
This note will analyze the Hydrocarbons Law-including its
provisions and the legal procedure pursuant to which it was enactedagainst the background of the political and economic situation of
Venezuela. Part I outlines the current situation in Venezuela,
including a description of the national work stoppage and the events
leading up to and following it. Part II describes the evolution of the
legal structure of the oil industry preceding the election of Chavez.
Part III details the major legal developments since Chavez's election
to the presidency, including the Constituci6n de la Repablica
Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999 (Constitution of the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, 1999 or Constitution of 1999), the Enabling
Law of 2000 and finally, the Hydrocarbons Law. The purpose of this
analysis is to attempt to determine how the enactment of the
Hydrocarbons Law culminated in a state of societal disarray in
Venezuela.
I. Current Situation in Venezuela
Although Chavez has faced numerous strikes by the oil workers
of the state-owned oil company, Petr6leos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PdVSA), since taking office in 1999, 9 the strike ending in February
2003 was by far the most damaging to Venezuela's economy." This

6. ALAN GELB AND ASSOCIATES, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? 289311 (1988).
7. Marc Lifsher, Oil ProducersBalk as Venezuela Tightens Terms on Investment,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at A21.
8. Gaceta Oficial de la Repdblica Bolivariana de Venezuela No. 37.323, Nov. 13,
2001 [hereinafter Hydrocarbons Law].
9. See, e.g., Oil Workers Win in Venezuela, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2000), at
Venezuelan Oil Workers
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/973027.stm>;
Call Strike, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2001), at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/
americas/1245063.stm>; New Law Sparks Venezuelan Oil Row, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1,
2001), at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1686157.stm>.
10. Venezuela Re-opens After Strike, supra note 1.
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oil sector strike was not only the longest, but it was also accompanied
by a national work stoppage in all areas of the economy." The strike
followed on the heels of an attempted coup against Chavez, which led
to his temporary resignation in April 2002.12 Chavez was forced to
resign as a result of earlier strikes initiated by the Confederaci6n de
Trabajadoresde Venezuela (Workers' Confederation of Venezuela or
CTV), the country's largest trade union, 3 and oil workers at PdVSA,"4
which culminated in the coup attempt by the Venezuelan military.15
However, Chavez was reinstated only forty-eight hours later,
following massive street protests by his supporters and support from
certain factions of the Venezuelan army.16
In late November 2002 Chavez's opposition again called for a
general strike, to begin in December, in an effort to force the
president to hold a referendum on whether he should resign from
office. 7 The general strike included oil workers and executives,
teachers, members of the press, business owners and workers from
virtually all walks of life, 8 and did not end until the first days of
February 2003.1' During the strike, Venezuelan oil production dipped

to 50% of pre-strike averages. 0 This was a major contributing factor
to an increase in gasoline prices in the United States,1 which depends
on Venezuela for about 13% of its daily oil imports.22 It is not
surprising that the political situation in Venezuela has such a strong
impact on global gas prices, considering that Venezuela is the world's
fourth-largest oil exporter and is the third-largest producer within the
11. Id.
12. Venezuela President Forced Out, BBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2002), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1925161.stm>.
13. Venezuela Strike is Extended, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2002), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1922289.stm>.
14. Venezuela Oil Dispute Escalates, BBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2002), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1912201.stm>.
15. Venezuela PresidentForced Out, supra note 12.
16. Tom Gibb, Analysis: After the Would-be Coup, BBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2002), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1929498.stm>.
17. Venezuela Heads Towards Fresh Strike, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2002), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2501411.stm>.
18. Venezuela Re-opens After Strike, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. Alexei Barrionuevo, How Technicians at Oil Giant Turned Revolutionaries,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at Al.
21. Briony Hale, Analysis: Venezuela's Oil Industry, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2002), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2549589.stm>.
22. Id.
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 23 It is
estimated that the strike cost Venezuela over $7.6 billion in revenues
and lost production,24 and resulted in the termination of over 18,000
striking oil sector employees by Chavez's government.25
In an effort to prevent any further violence in Venezuela relating
to Chavez's rule, in May 2003, the Organization of American States
(OAS) brokered an agreement between Chavez's government and its
opposition.26
In the OAS agreement, the parties stipulated,
"resolution of the crisis should be achieved through application of
Article 72 of the Constitution [of 1999].", 7 Article 72 of the
Constitution of 1999 establishes the mechanism by which a national
referendum may be held at the midway point of the president's term
in office,' which was August 19, 2003, for Chavez.29 After a failed
attempt in September 2003 to begin the referendum process, the
Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electorate Council or CNE), on
October 1, 2003, accepted an application from Chavez's opposition to
begin the referendum process, allowing the opposition the
opportunity to collect the signatures required by the Constitution of
1999 to hold a referendum on Chavez's rule.3 ° However, Chavez's
supporters have convinced the CNE to launch an investigation into
possible "irregularities" in the application process.3 In the event that
the investigation does not reveal any irregularities and the opposition
23. Bhushan Bahree & Marc Lifsher, The Other Crisis Facing Venezuela, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 18, 2002, at A9.
24. Venezuela Says Strike Has Cost It $76 Billion, WALL ST.J., Feb. 28, 2003, at
A7.
25. Mike Ceaser, Venezuela's Economic Legacy, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2003), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3026742.stm>.
26. Pact to End Venezuela Violence, BBC NEWS (May 29, 2003), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/world/americas/2948724.stm>.
27. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA AND THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL GROUPS
SUPPORTING IT, AND THE COORDINADORA DEMOCRATICA AND THE POLITICAL AND
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING IT, May 23, 2003, art. 12, available at

<www.oas.org>.
28. CONSTITuCION DE LA REP03BLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, 1999 art. 72
[Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999] [hereinafter
CONSTITUTION OF 1999].
29. Venezuela Sets Chavez Poll Limit, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2003), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3124593.stm>.
30. Aceptan Peticiones de Referendum Revocatorio en Venezuela, CNN EN
ESPA&OL
(Oct.
1, 2003), at <http://cnnenespanol.com/2003/americas/10/01/
venezuela.referendos/>.
31. Id.
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gathers the requisite signatures of 20 percent of registered voters, the
CNE anticipates that it would be at least four months before a
referendum could take place.32
Innumerable factors have contributed to the current situation in
Venezuela, including Chavez's far left-leaning and authoritarian
political policies,33 and relationships with unpopular figures, such as
Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein.34 Chavez has also been widely
accused of mismanagement of the economy35 and of the state-owned
oil company.36 However, the catalyst, which precipitated the strike of
2002-2003 and touched off the referendum efforts, was the enactment
of the Hydrocarbons Law by Chavez. The Hydrocarbons Law has
outraged the business community, partially due to the circumstances
under which it was enacted and partially due to the language of its
provisions.
II. Historical Legal Framework of the Oil Sector
The modern era of Venezuela's oil industry began with its
nationalization on January 1, 1976. After many years of increasing
governmental control over the oil sector, Venezuela nationalized its
oil industry by passing the Ley Orgdnica que Reserva al Estado la
Industria y Comercio de los Hidrocarburos(Organic Law Reserving

the Hydrocarbons Industry and Commerce to the State)
(LOREICH).3 7 LOREICH created the state-owned oil company,
PdVSA, which was formed as a private commercial enterprise with the
Republic of Venezuela as its sole shareholder and was granted a
monopoly over every aspect of oil extraction and production.38 In
addition to nationalizing the oil industry and creating PdVSA,
LOREICH severely limited opportunities for private investment in the
sector and erected massive administrative barriers to the possibility.39

32. Id.
33. Country Profile: Venezuela, BBC NEWS, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/country-profiles/1229345.stm> (visited Dec. 5, 2003).
34. Marc Lifsher, Government Drill: In Under 48 Hours, Venezuelans Have
Enough of a Coup, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at Al.
35. Venezuela Heads Towards Fresh Strike, supra note 17.
36. Marc Lifsher, Oil Workers Threaten Strike in Venezuela, WALL ST. J., Mar.
13, 2002, at A12.
37. Uisdean R. Vass & Adriana Lezcano, The New Venezuelan Legal Regime for
Natural Gas: A Hopeful New Beginning?, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 99, 103 (2001).
38. Id.
39. Jay G. Martin, Venezuela as an Opportunity for Investment in the Petroleum
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A result of these policies and nationalization was the flight of foreign
capital from the country.4" However, since nationalization occurred in
the midst of an oil boom lasting from 1972 to 1977 ' (causing the price
of Venezuelan oil to quadruple 42 and creating an influx of
"petrodollars" into Venezuela), the Venezuelan government was not
particularly concerned with the loss of foreign investment.
Following a downturn in oil revenues during the period 19771979, Venezuela experienced another sharp increase in oil prices,
lasting through 1981. 43 When this second boom ended, the
Venezuelan economy collapsed. With the lowering of oil prices
causing decreased oil revenues and a devaluation of the Venezuelan
currency, living standards dropped and the government could no
longer fund many social programs.44
In 1989, president Carlos Andres Perez came to power45 and was
saddled with the problems of a severely damaged economy, suffering
from years of declining oil revenues and nearly exhausted
international reserves.46 Perez introduced austerity measures in an
attempt to improve the condition of the ailing economy, which
included raising domestic petroleum prices (the state had previously
been selling petroleum internally at far below market rates),
removing protectionist barriers and restrictions on foreign
investment, decreasing indirect subsidies on consumer goods and,
most importantly, moving toward more privatization in the stateowned oil industry.47
The opening of the oil sector to increased private investment was
called the Apertura Petrolera (Oil Opening) and was implemented
through three rounds of privatization, each involving contracts to
Industry, 20 ENERGY L. J. 325, 328 (1999).
40. Id.
41. ALAN GELB AND ASSOCIATES, supra note 6, at 127.
42. Id. at 293.
43. Id. at 127, 129.
44. Mario J. Garcia-Serra, The "Enabling Law": The Demise of the Separationof
Powers in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265, 267
(2001).
45. POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, VENEZUELA: CHRONOLOGY OF
<www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Executive/Venezuela/pres.html>
at
PRESIDENTS,

(visited Dec. 5, 2003).
46. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES, VENEZUELA: A COUNTRY
STUDY, at <www.memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/vetoc.html> (visited Dec. 5, 2003).
47. MOISES NAIM, PAPER TIGERS AND MINOTAURS: THE POLITICS OF
VENEZUELA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS 45-54 (Rebecca Krafft ed., 1993).
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foreign investors at minimum investment levels.48 The Apertura
began to turn around the ailing oil sector and resulted in a 55%
increase in output from 1990 to 1997. 49 However, the majority of
Venezuelans, close to 70% of whom continue to live at a critical
poverty level," did not view the decreased subsidies on goods and
increases in petroleum prices as measures that would repair the ailing
economy, but rather as a drain on the pocketbooks that had already
suffered so much in the deflated economy of the previous decade. 1
Perez's popularity declined and the growing dissatisfaction with his
economic reforms culminated in a general strike and rioting, which
followed a raise in bus fares caused by an increase in gasoline prices. 2
Shortly thereafter, in 1992, the current president, Hugo Chavez, led
an attempted military coup against Perez. Although the coup failed,
Perez was eventually removed from office.53 With his removal from

office, many of Perez's reform programs were terminated, although
the improvements in the oil sector resulting from the Apertura were
still being enjoyed. 4
Throughout the 1990s, PdVSA was run much like a private sector
company in terms of profitability and was among the most efficient
oil companies in the world.5 PdVSA continued the process of
Apertura and began to acquire refining and marketing operations in
the United States, Europe and Asia. 56 Foreign investment in
Venezuela increased and the Energy Information Agency and the
United States Department of State praised the progress Venezuela
had made through the opening of its oil sector.57 One commentator
wrote in 1999, "Venezuela has re-fashioned itself into a country ripe

48. Martin, supra note 39, at 328-29.
49. Id. at 328.
50. Lowell Fleischer, Venezuela Alert: The Economy Continues to Deteriorate,
HEMISPHERE Focus (Oct. 2, 2002), available at <www.csis.org/americas/pubs/
h021003_14.htm>.
51. NAIM, supra note 47, at 59-62.
52. Id.
53. Analysis: Venezuela Awaits New Order, BBC NEWS (July 27, 1999), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/404777.stm>.
54. Martin, supra note 39, at 328.
55. In 2000, PdVSA had daily oil production levels similar to those of Pemex, the
state-owned oil company of Mexico, despite having roughly one-third the employees
of Pemex. Barrionuevo, supra note 20.
56. Vass & Lezcano, supra note 37, at 104.
57. Martin, supra note 39, at 330, 336, 343.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 27:351

for foreign investment in petroleum.""8 However, with the election of
Chavez in 1998, foreign investors began to grow wary of injecting
further capital into the Venezuelan economy. 9 Not only was the
international business community skeptical of his past involvement in
the attempted military coup in 1992, but also of his opposition to
continuing the Apertura program in Venezuela's oil sector, which he
began to voice early in his campaign.'
III. Creation of the Hydrocarbons Law
A.

Constitution of 1999

Upon his election to the presidency, Chavez's first major political
goal was to revamp the government and draft a new constitution (the
previous constitution had been in effect since 1961 with amendments
in 1983). 6 On April 25, 1999, a referendum was held on whether the
country should draft a new constitution. The referendum resulted in
92% of voters approving the measure (although voter turnout was
only 39%).62 On July 25, 1999, the people of Venezuela voted to
choose representatives for the Constituent Assembly, which would be
Supporters of
responsible for drafting the new constitution.63
of Staff and
Chief
brother,
wife,
Chavez's
Chavez-among them
twenty of his former military colleagues-succeeded in winning 123 of
the 131 seats in the Constituent Assembly. ' On December 15, 1999,
the Constitution of 1999 was approved by a 70% majority (although
voter turnout was again below 50%).65
The most important provisions of the Constitution of 1999
relating to the petroleum industry are Articles 12, 302 and 303.
Article 12 reserves ownership of the country's hydrocarbons still in

Id. at 328.
Id. at 338-42.
Id.
See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE VENEZUELA, 1961
REFORMAS DE 1983 [Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela, 1961
amendments of 1983].
62. Peter Greste, Venezuela Backs Political Overhaul, BBC NEwS
1999), at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/328045.stm>.
63. Venezuela Voting for New Assembly, BBC NEWS (July 25,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/403181.stm>.
64. Garcia-Serra, supra note 44, at 273.
65. Venezuela Backs New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/566096.stm>.
58.
59.
60.
61.

CON LAS

with the
(Apr. 26,
1999), at

1999),

at
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reservoir (unextracted petroleum products) to the state.66 This is not
abnormal for petroleum-exporting countries to do, even those that do
not exercise state ownership over the oil industry. 67 Article 302
reserves to the state the right to manage virtually every aspect of the
petroleum industry through the passage of appropriate legislation;
Article 303 decrees that ownership of all of the shares of PdVSA will
remain 68property of the state, but excludes shares in affiliates of
PdVSA.

While on its face the Constitution of 1999 may not appear to
allow for significant private participation in the Venezuelan oil
industry, commentators were hopeful that in its implementation it
would prove slightly more favorable to private investors than the
previous constitution of 1961.69 This hope was based partially on the
language of Article 303, which excluded affiliates of PdVSA from the
requirement that the state continue to be the primary shareholder in
oil companies.0 However, this exclusion has, in fact, not proved to be
particularly important in the five years that the Constitution of 1999
has been in effect. Expectations for increased privatization of the
petroleum industry were based primarily on Article 302.
Commentators pointed out that since the Constituent Assembly had
not expressly excluded private investors from the oil industry, but
rather deferred the question for legislation, it seemed likely that a
new hydrocarbons law would allow for more private participation. 1
With the passage of the Hydrocarbons Law, it seems that Article 302
also provided false hope for proponents of increased privatization of
the oil industry.
B. Enabling Law of 2000
The Constitution of 1999 contained, in Article 236(8), an
"enabling law" provision,72 which would allow the National Assembly
(which replaced a bicameral Congress under the new constitution) to
66. CONSTITUTION OF 1999 art. 12.
67. Vass & Lezcano, supra note 37, at 105.
68. CONSTITUTION OF 1999 arts. 302-03.
69. Uisdean R. Vass & Leopoldo Escobar, The Oil & Gas Articles of the New
at
Surprising Fifth Republic, available
Venezuelan Constitution: The
(visited
<http://www.macleoddixon.com/content/eng/publications/329-12877.htm>
Dec. 5, 2003).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CONSTITUTION OF 1999 art. 236(8).
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empower the president with the authority to rule by decree, or enact
laws without requiring the approval of the National Assembly. 3 An
enabling law is designed to allow the president to act within a limited
scope, for a limited period of time, to quickly enact measures,
74
In November 2000,
particularly in times of economic emergency.
authorizing Chavez
law
an
enabling
adopted
the National Assembly
to rule by decree in a broad range of areas-including finance,
economy, society, infrastructure, security and technology-for a
period of one year.7 ' Although enabling laws had been enacted on six
earlier occasions throughout Venezuela's history, the Enabling Law
of 2000 reached far beyond any of the previous ones, both in its broad
scope of authority, touching almost every aspect of Venezuelan life,
and in its prolonged duration of one year. 6
Chavez claimed that the Enabling Law was necessary to remedy
Venezuela's severe economic problems without overburdening the
legislature, while his critics argued that matters dealing with the oil
sector were beyond the scope of what a president should be entitled
to govern outside of the normal legislative process. However, the
Enabling Law was passed by a democratically-elected National
Assembly, whose responsibility it was to delineate the scope of the
powers it granted to the president at a level it felt necessary to enable
him to attempt to remedy the dire economic situation in Venezuela.
Additionally, it should be noted that the National Assembly was both
the body that authorized the Enabling Law, and that was handing
over its own legislative powers to the president. It has been argued
that the passage of such a wide-ranging enabling law was outside the
scope of the National Assembly's powers and should have been
struck down by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Venezuela's highest
court, as a violation of separation of powers." However, the issue was
never presented before the Tribunal. It was pursuant to the powers
granted to him under the Enabling Law of 2000 that Chavez enacted
the Hydrocarbons Law.79

73. Garcia-Serra, supra note 44, at 276.
74. Id. at 274-75.
75. Id. at 276.
76. Id. at 274-75, 281.
77. Venezuela's Chavez Gets Sweeping Powers, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2000), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1011993.stm>.
78. Garcia-Serra, supra note 44, at 277.
79. Hydrocarbons Law, Habilitacion [Authorization].
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C. Hydrocarbons Law of 2001
The Hydrocarbons Law was one of forty-nine laws enacted by
Chavez during his grant of unilateral legislative power under the
Enabling Law,8° and was decreed hours before Chavez's enabling
The Hydrocarbons Law completely
powers were to expire."
restructured the petroleum sector, replacing the Hydrocarbons Law
of 1943, which had previously governed the sector.' A single-handed
restructuring of the central industry of Venezuela, of a magnitude not
seen in almost sixty years, would clearly seem to go beyond the
purview of the limited emergency power that an enabling law is
intended to bestow upon the president. 83 However, although
Chavez's opposition,' including Venezuela's top business leaders,85
have threatened to challenge the constitutionality of the
Hydrocarbons Law in the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the Law has
now been in effect for over two years and has not yet been
challenged. In addition to the questionable constitutionality of both
the Hydrocarbons Law and the Enabling Law, Venezuela's business
community resents the procedure by which the Hydrocarbons Law
came into effect. Although the government allowed private sector
business leaders to voice their opinions on the development of the
Law, their suggestions were largely ignored. 6
Among the most controversial measures included in the
Hydrocarbons Law are Articles 22 and 44. Article 22 requires that
the state maintain over 50 percent participation in all new petroleum
projects.81 Under the preexisting legal structure, any new projects
involving private investors were to be accomplished through joint
ventures with the state-owned oil company, PdVSA. 88 Under Article
80. Lifsher, supra note 7.
81. Venezuelan Union to Join Bosses' Strike, BBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2001), at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1692860.stm>.
82. Hydrocarbons Law, Disposiciones Transitorias [Provisional Regulations].
83. See Garcia-Serra, supra note 44, at 276-77.
84. Fabiola Sanchez, Law Tightens Grip on Venezuela's Oil, Associated Press,
Nov. 28, 2001.
85. Venezuela 2002: In Search of a Confrontation... of Ideas, Interview with
at
available
TIMES (2002),
Pedro Carmona, FEDECAMARAS, WASH.
<www.international reports.net/theamericas/venezuela/2002/insearch.html>.
86. Id.
87. Hydrocarbons Law art. 22.
88. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2001 COUNTRY REP. ON ECON. POLICY AND TRADE
PRACTICES: VENEZUELA (Feb. 2002), available at <www.state.gov/documents/
organization/8215.pdf>.
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22 of the Hydrocarbons Law, none of these joint ventures can be
realized without PdVSA having a majority stake.89 This result is
troubling for several reasons. First, it is unlikely that PdVSA has, or
will have in the near future, the resources to provide over 50% of the
capital required for each new undertaking involving private
investors. 9' Even before the general strike began, PdVSA experienced
losses in production capacity, from which it did not have the capital to
recover. 9' With PdVSA in such a financial condition that it cannot
fund its own production, it seems virtually impossible that it would be
able to invest in any new projects, much less provide 50% of the
capital for all new joint ventures. Thus, foreign investors would be
prevented from investing in petroleum operations in Venezuela.
Secondly, the requirement of such extensive state involvement in
petroleum projects defeats many of the policies of the Apertura.
Under the Apertura, Venezuela generated $20 billion in foreign
investment and reached record levels of production. 9 Chavez has
blamed the high rate of poverty in Venezuela partially on
mismanagement of the oil sector, 93 claiming that oil windfalls during
the Apertura were diverted from state programs and from the people
of Venezuela and that more state control would ensure better
management and more money to distribute to the poor. While this is
an admirable motivation for including a provision like Article 22 in
the new Hydrocarbons Law, it overlooks the fact that if the oil sector
loses private investors, the amount of revenues to distribute to the
poor will be diminished.94
In a further attempt to ensure that more of Venezuela's
petroleum revenues ended up in the hands of the poor, Chavez
included Article 44 in the Hydrocarbons Law. Article 44 raises the
percentage of revenue from oil production required to be paid in
royalties to the government from 16.7% to 30%. 95 The almost
doubling of the percentage of royalties that private investors must pay
to the government could increase the amount of royalties received by
the government by as much as 80%.6 In theory, this would be 80%
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Hydrocarbons Law art. 22.
Lifsher, supra note 7.
Fleischer, supra note 50.
Sanchez, supra note 84.
New Law Sparks Venezuelan Oil Row, supra note 9.
Id.
Hydrocarbons Law art. 44.
Lifsher, supra note 7.
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more money from private investors in the oil industry that the
government would be able to spend on social programs, and which
could be distributed to the poor. However, this rationale again fails
to take into account the reaction of foreign investors to a doubled
royalty rate. The average royalty rate among all oil-producing
countries is 7.1%, and 14.7% among OPEC members."' In no other
country does the rate exceed 20%." With rates as high as 30% in
Venezuela, the disincentive to invest in the Venezuelan petroleum
sector, in favor of almost any other oil-producing country, is
impossible to ignore.
In addition to the criticisms of the Hydrocarbons Law relating to
the discouragement of foreign investment, there have been various
other reasons offered for dissatisfaction with it. The VenezuelanAmerican Chamber of Commerce, a business association which often
speaks on behalf of the major U.S. oil companies," pointed out in a
letter to Chavez that the Hydrocarbons Law provided no guarantee
of property rights for private companies, nor any assurance of the
fulfillment of contractual obligations in existing contracts.'" Some
characterize the increased state control effected by the Hydrocarbons
Law as one more step in Chavez's bid to acquire dictatorial rule in
Venezuela. 1 A Venezuelan economist described the law's central
objective as the imposition of "absolute state control over the oil
industry."' '° The U.S. Department of State has also expressed its
concern over the uncertain impact the Hydrocarbons Law will have
on international participation in the Venezuelan oil market, and the
devastating effects that it will ultimately have on the ailing
Venezuelan economy. 03
Despite the potential far-reaching effects of the Hydrocarbons
Law, Chavez argues that it merely implements provisions of the
°' which was drafted by the democraticallyConstitution of 19 99 ,"
elected Constituent Assembly and voted into law by the people of
Venezuela. This is technically true, considering the ambiguity of
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Article 302 of the Constitution, which provides only that the state
retains management power over the petroleum industry (as
exercisable through the passage of appropriate legislation)."'
However, just as commentators had expected that this provision of
the Constitution was a hopeful sign for increased privatization of the
oil industry,' °6 so too, perhaps, did the people of Venezuela who voted
in support of the Constitution. In addition, it seems unlikely that the
voters of Venezuela envisioned that the legislation referred to in
Article 302 would be enacted unilaterally by the president, rather
than by the legislature. But, unless the Supreme Tribunal of Justice
reviews the Enabling Law of 2000 or the Hydrocarbons Law, the
regime created by the Hydrocarbons Law will prevail, having been
enacted through a process provided for in the Constitution of 1999.
The Supreme Tribunal of Justice is the branch of government
given responsibility for upholding constitutional principles under
Article 335 of the Constitution of 1999, and is also the final
interpreter of the Constitution."7 Article 336(1) expressly gives the
Supreme Tribunal the power to nullify laws passed by the National
Assembly when they do not adhere to the Constitution9 Further,
under Article 336(3), the Supreme Tribunal is given the ability to
nullify any law decreed by the executive which does not conform to
constitutional principles."°
Therefore, the Supreme Tribunal of
Justice does possess the requisite power to declare both the Enabling
Law of 2000 and the Hydrocarbons Law unconstitutional, under
Articles 336(1) and 336(3), respectively. However, one difficulty in
bringing a challenge to the Enabling Law of 2000 would be that
enabling laws have been used several times before in Venezuela's
history, and none were declared unconstitutional."' Perhaps a larger
difficulty in bringing challenges to either law is that the current
Supreme Tribunal of Justice is composed of justices who are largely
sympathetic to Chavez and who were elected to twelve-year terms in
the same 2000 election where Chavez was reelected with 60 percent of
the vote."' Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Tribunal
would be sympathetic to constitutional challenges against either the
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Enabling Law of 2000 or the Hydrocarbons Law, since the majority
owes its election largely to Chavez's popularity in 2000.112 In addition,
it does not appear as though any parties have sought to present a
constitutional challenge to either of the laws.
Thus far, the effects of the Hydrocarbons Law suggest a dismal
future for Venezuela's economy and particularly its oil sector.
Following the enactment of the Hydrocarbons Law, in the first
quarter of 2002, the Venezuelan economy contracted 4.2% and
further sank 10% in the second quarter."' Despite the increase in
world oil prices in the second quarter of 2002, the 10% contraction
included a shrinking of 16.7% in the petroleum sector.'1 While the
Hydrocarbons Law had not been in effect for very long, these figures
are discouraging. Despite Chavez's efforts to redistribute wealth to
the poor, Venezuelan salaries are 20% of what they were in 1980, and
the standard of living has fallen to levels lower than in 1962."'
Conclusion
The difficulties present in the Venezuelan economy were not
created in a short period of time nor are they apt to be resolved in the
near future. Introducing sweeping changes into the legal structure of
the petroleum sector may have appeared to president Hugo Chavez
and his supporters to be the precise action necessary to begin the
process of bridging the gap between rich and poor in Venezuela.
Effecting this restructuring under the rationale that the people of
Venezuela are entitled to receive more benefits from their country's
lucrative oil industry is, perhaps, an admirable undertaking. Or, as
some argue, it may merely be the action of a president who is in
endless pursuit of authoritarian power. Whatever the motivation
behind Chavez's Hydrocarbons Law decree, the creation of the Law
appears to have been shortsighted. It has been the cause of extreme
domestic unrest, enraging many who foresee decreased levels of
private investment and the potential downfall of the oil industry in
Venezuela. Ultimately, the Hydrocarbons Law has also proved
ineffective in moving toward the accomplishment of Chavez's lofty
socialistic ideals, and thus far has proven detrimental to Chavez's
remaining supporters amongst the poor, lowering petroleum
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Fleischer, supra note 50.
Id.
Id.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 27:351

revenues, salaries and the standard of living.
It is undeniable that the Enabling Law of 2000, which led to
Chavez's acquisition of the power to unilaterally decree the
Hydrocarbons Law, was enacted by a democratically-elected body
within the framework of constitutional procedures. However, it is
questionable whether the scope of the Enabling Law violated the
separation of powers embodied in the Constitution of 1999.
Additionally, the enactment of the Hydrocarbons Law by Chavez,
although technically within the letter of the Constitution, may have
exceeded the scope of his powers under the Enabling Law. It is also
arguable that allowing the president to unilaterally legislate in order
to restructure such an important sector of the economy violates
democratic principles, in a nation that has prided itself on its long
democratic history.
While there are many unanswered questions pertaining to the
legality of these measures, any solution can only be speculative unless
and until the Supreme Tribunal of Justice reviews their
constitutionality. It seems that the recent unrest in Venezuela stems
mainly from the popular sense that Chavez's policy is insulated from
any meaningful review. The opponents of these measures may feel
that appealing to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice would be a fruitless
pursuit, considering the relationship of the justices to Chavez. Since
the Hydrocarbons Law was enacted by the president alone, the voters
cannot appeal to their elected representatives to consider alternative
solutions. The only recourse available to them until August 2003 was
to attempt to convince the president to step down, as he had been the
lone source of the laws enacted pursuant to the Enabling Law.
Ultimately, this was precisely what many Venezuelans tried in vain to
accomplish with the national work stoppage and petroleum sector
strike, and continue at attempt with their efforts to hold a national
referendum. In the end, the Hydrocarbons Law remains in effectunless and until its constitutionality is challenged in the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice. And Chavez remains in power until 2006-unless
and until he is voted out in a referendum.

